The Middle East has been a central focus of the United States' foreign policy. The purpose of the current research is to shed light on the United States' economic and political presence in the Middle East region before and after World War I and after World War II to understand how United States' presence has developed in the region and what motives were behind its presence. This is accomplished by exploring broad economic, strategic, and political motives of the United States. Specifically, the article explores the United States' primary interests in the Middle East including securing strategic access to oil in the Gulf region, supporting and protecting Israel's sovereignty, maintaining the United States' military bases, defending client-states and friendly regimes, and resisting Islamic movements and terrorist groups.
Introduction
The Middle East has continued to garner the primary attention of the United States' foreign policy since World War II, and this paper seeks to explore reasons for this phenomenon, which, to date, has received little research attention. The significance of the Middle East area has increased rapidly since WWll primarily due to economic, strategic, and political factors. Culturally, the region has numerous similarities with the West, dating back to the time of the Crusades in the Middle Ages and continuing through modern history with the efforts of the Western missionaries and their educational activities.
The Middle East consists of portions of three continents: Europe, Asia, and Africa. The land possesses vital resources including oil and waterways (Lenczowski, 1984) .
The United States' Foreign Policy toward the Middle East after World War I
During and after World War I, the American political thoughts, ideas, and principles were appealing to the Middle East. In addition, President Woodrow Wilson's concept of "self-determination" of nations was essential and supportive to the rights of people to decide to have their own political destiny. These concepts were very attractive to the Arabs nationalists' dreams to attain independence. Moreover, the Wilsonian ideas "…provided a stimulus to Arab nationalism in the years ahead. Until the creation of the State of Israel (in 1948) , the United States enjoyed widespread prestige and admiration in the Arab world." (Crabb, Jr., 1983, p. 400) .
In 1917 (Hertz, 2008) .
In the aftermath of World War I, even though the Middle East region was under heavy European influence, American contacts, especially petroleum companies, with the region increased steadily. While American companies gained only a partial interest in businesses in Iran and Kuwait, they attained full control in Saudi Arabia and the Bahrain Island (Pratt, 1972) .
The period between the two world wars shows that the United States remained only slightly involved in the Middle Eastern affairs from a political standpoint; on the other hand, the United States had established multiple economic contacts within the Middle East region. The American petroleum companies negotiated a number of concessions in Iran, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Bahrain. During World War II, the United States' presence in the Middle East in-
The United States' Foreign Policy toward the Middle East after World War II
The United States' political presence in the Middle East did not intensify until the end of World War II. Prior to that, three indirect occurrences may be cited in this regard: "1) Iran was used as a transit route for the sending of Lend-Lease supplies to the Soviet Union from [1941] [1942] [1943] [1944] [1945] ; 2) Aramco, the Arabian-American Oil Company, was established in Saudi Arabia in 1938; 3) America influenced the Arab nationalist movement in the early 1920s through its domestic ideals." (Jones, Jr., 1973, p. 184) . Since that time, influenced by shifts in power, interest in oil, and the Palestine Question, the United States has consistently focused their attention on the Middle East. At the end of World War II, a new balance of power prevailed in the international arena. The United States and the Soviet Union emerged as the only two superpowers in the international system. The main European powers (Britain and France) faced substantial economic difficulties and were no longer capable of playing their traditional leading roles in the Middle East. In the early 1940s, President Roosevelt and his administration initially expected that Britain would remain the security chief in the region. However, by the spring of 1944 observers reported, "Soviet policy in the Arab world appears to be aimed at the reduction of British influence in that area and the acquisition of the balance of power." Then, on May 8, 1945, State Department personnel determined that Britain was unable to maintain the Soviet Union and realized the United States might have to take charge of "fostering the economic advancement of the Middle East people" and "facilitating freedom from external interference and exploitation." (Little, 2002, pp. 119-120) .
After World War II, the Kremlin wanted to spread its influence along Russia's southern border. In 1941, Josef Stalin ordered Soviet troops into Iran and increased diplomatic pressure on Turkey, which had previously refused the "Red Navy" to cross the Dardanelles (the channels between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean). By the fall of 1945, the United States' policymakers expected the worst. "The British publicly admit that they are no longer able to keep the Middle East in order without … [US] help." The State Department cautioned the President that "Soviet Russia is showing a marked interest in the area." If the United States did not respond "firmly and adequately," another world war might result. Washington, responded by issuing the Truman Doctrine in 1947 that indicated that the United States would take over Britain's commitment to Greece and Turkey." (Little, 2002, pp. 119-120) .
In the mid-1950s, concern regarding possible Soviet expansion in the Middle Open Journal of Political Science
East region motivated Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, to seek out allies in the states closest to the Soviet Union (Lenczowski, 1984 After ten years of Anglo-Arab confrontations, the United States' policymakers presented the Eisenhower Doctrine, making Washington a high-ranking member of the Anglo-American Association in 1957 (Little, 2002) . The Eisenhower Doctrine was established in response to the 1956 Suez War, the Soviet Union's infiltration of the Arab states, and to limit Nasser's expansive pan-Arabism. Following the 1958 Lebanon crisis, Baghdad Pact members, except Iraq, endorsed American intervention in Lebanon. In 1959, Iraq withdrew from METO resulting in METO to be renamed as the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), and its headquarters to be moved from Baghdad to Ankara. The United States' support to CENTO continued as a non-signatory associate until it completely dissolved in 1979 ("The Baghdad Pact (1955) and the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO)," 2009).
Through the 1960's, Britain continued to experience financial difficulties and was eventually forced to give up its remaining imperial stations in the Arabian Peninsula and the Gulf region. It was at this time that American officials began moving toward what would come to be known as the Nixon Doctrine, which appointed countries in the region, including Iran and Saudi Arabia, to join in the opposition against the Soviet Union. However, when the appointed Middle Eastern countries proved they were ultimately unable to fill this role effectively, Jimmy Carter created his own doctrine and "informed the world in January 1980 that the United States had vital security interests in the Middle East for which it was willing to fight, whether it had dependable partners or not." (Little, 2002, pp. 119-120) .
It is important to point out that since the beginning of the Cold War, the United States had developed several policies, strategies, and tactics to limit possible Soviet expansion in the world and in the Middle East region in particular. Containment, détente, and deterrence were among the most notable policies during the context of the Cold War. In the early 1990s, the Cold War era came to an end, and the Soviet Union threat to the region ended, with the impact of international communism at its lowest in decades. As a result of the Cold War, the United States remained as the sole dominant superpower in the post-Cold War era. Hegemony, leadership, primacy, and military power clearly marked American foreign policy in international affairs in the late twentieth century and early twenty-first century. 
Securing Strategic Access to Oil in the Gulf Region
The primary interest of the United States in the Middle East region is to assure American access to oil. Oil, however, was not considered significant until the end of the nineteenth century. The First Industrial Revolution that began in the last decades of the eighteenth century was fueled by water power and then by coal. The Second Industrial Revolution was driven by the surge of readily available and comparatively cheap oil that became a growing necessity in the world's rapidly expanding petroleum-based economies. This spurred an insatiable thirst for fresh supplies of crude and new markets in which to expand. In the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century, the petroleum industry and the consumption of oil-based products developed rapidly across the world and especially in Europe and North America. At the time, the main sources of oil were Russia, the United States, Mexico, and Romania (Gelvin, 2005) .
In this context, it should be noted that in the early twentieth century, the petroleum industries flourished all over the world, but most especially in Europe and North America. During World War I, major world powers began to prioritize oil as a vital military asset; modern warfare caused a constant need for oil and its subsidiary petroleum-based products which were a necessity for ships, airplanes, tanks, submarines, and the lubrication of modern rifles. This heavy use of oil during World War I created a severe shortage in 1917 -1918 (Paul, 2002 .
Following World War I, several Western companies gained mutual concession in the Middle East, especially in Iran, Bahrain, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia. The idea behind these mutual concessions was to negotiate solutions to incom-Open Journal of Political Science patible political and business agendas and to make entrepreneurial explorations safer. At the close of the Second World War, the United States government became wary about cutbacks in oil production and the possible economic hiccups that would stem from a fuel shortage. To prevent a fuel shortage, the United States made economic demands for concessions with multiple Middle Eastern countries. This requirement started in the pre-war years with concessions in Bahrain (1929) , Kuwait (1934), and Saudi Arabia (1947) . These concessions were shared by multiple oil companies (Rustow, 1982) .
In 1948, following American demands, several companies were developed to exploit these concessions. The Arabian American Oil Company (ARAMCO) was created by Esso (now Exxon), Texaco, Standard Oil of California (SoCal), and Mobil all came into existence to develop the Saudi concessions. These companies soon surveyed and developed large production fields that allowed them to harvest massive profits from low-cost oil that would be used to rebuild the economies of Europe and Japan that had been destroyed during World War II. The boom eventually brought this cheap oil to United States shores and stimulated the growth of the post-war American economy, which reiterated the desire for more United States companies to seek concessions in Kuwait, Iran, and other oil producers in the region (Diller, 1991) .
Meanwhile, as the development of the Middle Eastern concessions increased, the United States oil production began to decrease in ratio to its increased consumption. This grew to as much as 30% of the world's total consumption of crude oil with only an estimated 6% of the world's reserves (Iskandar, 1974) .
Following World War II, the United States began looking for alternative sources of oil abroad to meet its own future demands. The Middle East was very attractive to both the United States government and American petroleum companies due to its proven long-term oil reserves. Arab oil reserves were shown to potentially have much more than the originally estimated 60% of the world oil reserves. In fact, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Kuwait, and Abu Dhabi possessed more than 50% of the known reserves amongst themselves alone (Iskandar, 1974) . To attest to this high-quality Middle Eastern oil was known to flow freely of its own pressure. This circumstance allowed for much cheaper production costs; the Middle East per production barrel ranged between $0.10 and $0.22 cents in comparison to $0.39 cents in Venezuela, and as much as $1.51 per barrel in the United States. This is a considerable difference when it comes to the bottom line (Rustow, 1982 (Gelvin, 2005) . Throughout the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, Arab members of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) led an embargo against the United States in response to the decision to re-supply the Israeli military. The embargo also applied to other countries that braced Israel including South Africa, the Netherlands, and Portugal. Petroleum exports were barred, and manufacturing reductions were made, straining the United States' economy that was extremely reliant on foreign oil.
Supporting and Protecting Israel's Sovereignty
The second interest of the United States in the Middle East region is to safeguard the state of Israel and to ensure its stability in the often troubled region. In fact, maintaining a strong Israel in the Middle East solidifies American national security interests there. This perspective has dominated American foreign policy since the mid-twentieth century and continues to shape the current policy.
The historical land of Palestine was under the authority of the Ottoman Empire until the end of World War I, when Britain assumed control of Palestine as a mandate under the League of Nations. During World War I (1914 War I ( -1918 , secret agreements were made between the British government and the British Zionist community leaders, leading to the Balfour Declaration and establishing a "national home" for the Jewish people in Palestine.
Before Britain announced the Balfour Declaration, the British government tried to persuade President Woodrow Wilson to endorse the proposed statement (Balfour Declaration). Initially, Wilson was reluctant to do so as he thought that such a declaration would worsen US-Ottoman relations. Finally, under pressure by Louis D. Brandeis, an influential Zionist leader in America and Wilson's close friend and confident, President Wilson showed sympathy with the Balfour Declaration. The British saw Wilson's approval of the draft declaration as de facto support for a Jewish homeland in Palestine and support for British control of this area as protectorate following the war. This tacit support went against Wilson's agenda of self-determination put forth in his Fourteen Points and undermined the Palestinian Arab's right to self-determination, but this would not stop the United States from adopting the Balfour Declaration (Mulhall, CSP., 1995) . In September 1922, Congress adopted a resolution approving the Balfour Declaration, and thus formalized the United States' foreign policy toward Palestine. 
Maintaining the United States' Military Bases
The installations overseas and another 77 in non-continental U.S. territories. Fifteen of these facilities were estimated to be worth more than $1.6 billion each, whereas an additional 19 were valued at between $862 million and $1.6 billion." (Cooley, 2008, p. 5) . itary presence in the region has helped to guarantee safe access to oil for America and its allies, to ensure stability and security of the friendly regimes, to provide quick response to internal and external crises, to counter radical forces and Islamic extremist groups that might threaten American interests in the region, and, finally, to support the short and long-term strategic foreign policy agendas of the United States.
Defending Client-states and Friendly Regimes
The fourth interest of the United States in the Middle East region is maintaining a close relationship with its "client-states" and friendly regimes. The Dictionary of Government and Politics defines client-state as a "country which depends on another country for such things as defense, trade, etc." (Collin, 1998, p. 50 (Fry, Goldstein, & Langhorne, 2002, p. 9) .
At the beginning of the Cold War, several Middle Eastern countries were divided into two respective camps. In one camp, countries such as Egypt and Syria supported the Soviet Union and were adopting international communist ideas. In the other camp, countries such as Greece, Turkey, and Israel backed the United States and adopted capitalist ideas and style. Both parties, however, were getting economic, military, and diplomatic support from either Washington or Moscow. In addition, to some extent, a few states were able to use their diplomatic skills to gain support from both parties. Protecting client-states has been essential to the United States' foreign policy for many decades. However, since the United States has expanded its interests overseas, it has used a system of revolving maintenance of particular regimes and has needed to take on additional clients from time to time to affect its interests (Sylvan & Majeski, 2003) . Since the early1940s, the United States has pledged to provide economic, military, and protective assistance to several countries in the Middle East to maintain its national security and strategic interests there. Specifically, the following countries became "client-states" of the United States dating back to the mid-1940s:
Saudi Arabia (1945), Greece and Turkey (1947 ), Israel (1948 ), Iran (1953 , Pakistan (1954) , Lebanon (1957 and ends in 1975 ), Jordan (1963 ), Tunisia (1974 (1976) , Kuwait, Bahrain, and Oman (in 1991-1992) (Sylvan & Majeski, 2003 
Resisting Islamic Movements and Terrorist Groups
The fifth interest of the United States' foreign policy in the Middle East region is countering the Islamic resistance movements and terrorist groups. Following the Soviet Union invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, the United States and its allies condemned the Soviet action against Afghanistan. Then, the United States government developed a number of measures to enforce the Soviets to withdraw their forces. As previously referenced, President Carter, in his State of the Union address on January 23, 1980, said "An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force." (Carter, 2001, p. 857) .
As a direct result of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the United States, China, and Arab states both openly and subversively supplied money and mili- way to the next generation of Afghan rebels, who would come to be known as the Taliban (Rashid, 2001 ).
In the early 1990s, an Afghan faction of Mujaheddin formed the Taliban, Islamic forces who opposed Afghanistan's occupation by the Soviet Union (1979) (1980) (1981) (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) . Covertly, the United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and its Pakistani counterpart, the Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI) backed this group (Laub, 2014) . As a result of this war, the Soviet Union lost billions of dollars and, ultimately, this provoked the economic and political collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s.
Afterward, the Taliban emerged as one of the strongest Islamic factions in and the United Arab Emirates), began air strikes against ISIS targets in Syria "to take out the militant group's ability to command, train and resupply its fighters" (Fantz & Pearson, 2015) .
Based on the information reviewed, it seems that the United States is concerned that if extremist Islamic militants gain control over WMD (nuclear, radiological, chemical, or biological) , there would be a real threat to American national security interests, especially those in the Middle East region, perhaps leading to a rapid destabilization of the entire region.
Conclusion
This article found that the United States' economic and political presence in the 
